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Greene: Constitutional Rhetoric

Lectures
CONSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC
Jamal Greene*
For close to a century, students of judicial behavior have suggested
that what judges think is not altogether the same as what they say. Within
the legal academy, this claim has long been associated with legal realists
who have argued that the formal legal rules explicated in judicial opinions
are at least partly epiphenomenal, masking the influence that the personal
characteristics and dispositions of adjudicators exercise over legal
outcomes.1 Political scientists have argued, variously, that such outcomes
are determined by ideology,2 social background,3 or political,
professional, or other institutional constraints. 4
The notion that at least some “extralegal” factors influence judicial
decision making is sufficiently intuitive and well established to be

*

Professor of Law, Columbia Law School. Much of the substance of this Essay was
delivered as the 2014 Seegers Lecture on Jurisprudence at Valparaiso University Law School.
I would like to thank the faculty of the Law School and other guests at the Seegers Lecture
for stimulating questions and comments.
1
See generally JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1936) (arguing that the law
is and should be uncertain and therefore requires the exercise of judicial discretion); KARL
N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY (1930) (emphasizing the
indeterminacy and contingency of law and fact).
2
See generally C. HERMAN PRITCHETT, THE ROOSEVELT COURT: A STUDY IN JUDICIAL
POLITICS AND VALUES, 1937–1947 (1948) (studying the values reflected in the voting patterns
of the Roosevelt Court); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES AND
IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946–1963 (1965) (using statistical methods to code
Justices in ideological terms); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (advancing on the empirical models of Schubert and
other attitudinalists); see also James L. Gibson, From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development
of Theory in the Study of Judicial Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAVIOR 7, 9 (1983) (summarizing the
attitudinal model).
3
See C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of the Voting Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court
Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economic Decisions, 1946–1978, 75 AM. POL. SCI. REV.
355, 363 (1981) (constructing a model of Supreme Court Justice behavior drawing on factors
relating, among other things, to socialization).
4
See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE (2013) (emphasizing a
rational choice approach that integrates ideological considerations with professional and
institutional constraints on judges); Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The
Supreme Court as a National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 280 (1957) (discussing coherence
between views of judges and majoritarian politics); see also Barry Friedman, The Politics of
Judicial Review, 84 TEX. L. REV. 257, 262–63 (2005) (urging legal academics to integrate positive
political science into their work).
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regarded as a fact.5 It is fair to expect, moreover, that such factors wield
still greater influence in close cases of constitutional law, and particularly
in cases involving constitutional rights. The outcomes of such cases are
tightly bound up with deep and fundamentally divergent political
commitments and social values. A vast and growing literature explores
these and related issues.6
The dichotomy between the factors that drive judicial decision
making, on one hand, and the public justification for such decision
making, on the other, obscures a different dichotomy that lies wholly
within the domain of opinion-writing. This is the dichotomy between, on
one hand, what judges say to explain or justify their decisions, and on the
other hand, what judges say to persuade their audience that those
decisions, and their associated reasons, are correct.
Within constitutional law, it is sometimes assumed that there are two
decision nodes in the process of legal adjudication: first, the moment of
decision; and second, the moment of explanation or justification. 7 This
second node is the point at which the judge conforms his or her decision,
however reached, to his or her understanding of what the law requires.
There is, however a third node. Having decided what the law requires,
the judge must further communicate that decision to a diverse audience
of fellow judges, litigants, other legal professionals, and the broader
public. This act of communication is not simply a logical transcription of
the legal justification reached at the second decision node. Rather, or in
addition, it requires constitutional judges to engage in forms of rhetoric.
The challenge of legal persuasion bears no necessary relationship to the
process of legal decision making: it arises whether a decision is reached
legalistically or politically, reflectively or intuitively, in good faith or bad.
I shall refer to an opinion’s explanatory moves as demonstrative and its
persuasive moves as rhetorical.8 This nomenclature serves a largely
See Donald R. Songer & Stefanie A. Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of Justices’
Values on Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1049, 1049 (1996) (“A half century
of empirical scholarship has now firmly established that the ideological values and the policy
preferences of Supreme Court justices have a profound impact on their decisions in many
cases.”).
6
EPSTEIN, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 4, at 65–99.
7
There is nothing talismanic about constitutional law. This Essay’s observations surely
apply to other legal domains. The discussion is confined to constitutional law because it has
some distinctive (if not unique) epistemological features of particular relevance to the
discussion that follows. See text accompanying notes 136–38.
8
Aristotle defined “demonstration” as “a syllogism productive of scientific knowledge.”
ARISTOTLE, POSTERIOR ANALYTICS bk. I, pt. II (G.R.G. Mure trans., 1928). He defined
“rhetoric” as “the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion.”
ARISTOTLE, ON RHETORIC: A THEORY OF CIVIC DISCOURSE bk. 1, ch. 2 (George A. Kennedy,
trans., 2007) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC].
5
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expository purpose, for as we shall see, many judicial opinions in the
United States—and nearly all Supreme Court opinions—are rhetorical
devices whose content, even when logically grounded, is difficult to
understand in purely demonstrative terms. Still, the distinction helps to
illuminate a set of rhetorical moves that are clearly not grounded in logos.
It also preserves the argument—which I do not fully contest here—that
constitutional law has propositional content independent of who
describes it and to whom.
What can we learn from recognizing the distinction between
demonstration and rhetoric in constitutional cases? Are there constraints
on the forms of rhetoric that characterize judicial expression? Are any
constraints, such as they are, particular to constitutional adjudication?
Are they particular to appellate adjudication? What role should rhetoric
play in constitutional opinion-writing?
To offer some answers to these questions, I begin, in Part I, with four
examples, or discourses, that anyone familiar with contemporary debates
in U.S. constitutional law will recognize: the distinction between original
meaning and original intent; reference to anticanonical cases such as Dred
Scott v. Sandford9 or Lochner v. New York;10 the relationship between
substantive due process and the constitutional text; and the citation of
foreign law in U.S. constitutional opinions. Maintaining a notional
distinction between demonstrative and rhetorical opinion-writing
illuminates and better organizes what otherwise looks like a cycle of
confusion and intractable disagreement that characterizes these
discourses.
Part II defends judicial rhetoric in constitutional cases as not just
pervasive and inevitably descriptive, but also as normatively desirable.
To be interesting, the claim must be that rhetoric can be appropriate even
when it obscures the logic of or misleads the audience as to the underlying
legal proposition. Part II defends that claim on the ground that
articulating constitutional law persuasively helps it to endure and
therefore helps to constitute it over time. This Essay concludes with some
observations about the degree to which this claim is contingent upon an
especially “protestant” understanding of constitutional authority and the
operation of judicial review.11

60 U.S. 393 (1857).
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
11
See SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 29 (1988) (contrasting the “protestant”
position on constitutional authority as “based on the legitimacy of individualized (or at least
nonhierarchical communal) interpretation [], while the catholic position is that the Supreme
Court is the dispenser of ultimate interpretation”).
9

10
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I. CASE STUDIES IN CONSTITUTIONAL RHETORIC
In Aristotle’s classical terms, rhetoric takes three overarching (and
overlapping) forms: logos or appeals to logic; ethos or appeals to the
character of the speech; and pathos or appeals to emotion.12 As noted
above, rhetoric can mislead.13 It does not always do so, but when it does
not, we are more apt to call it exposition. 14 This is especially so when, in
legal discourse, rhetoric assumes the logical mode. This Part discusses
four case studies in which rhetorical expression, typically outside the
logical mode, masquerades as demonstrative. Recognizing the rhetorical
nature of the claims helps us to understand arguments within these
discourses that are otherwise mysterious.
A. Original Meaning and Original Intent
Originalism has been central to interpretive debates in constitutional
law over the last three decades.15 For perhaps the last two of those
decades, the importance of the distinction between original intent and
original meaning has been central to debates over originalism. 16
Understanding the rhetorical dimensions of constitutional opinionwriting helps us to see a compatibility between original meaning and
original intent that we would otherwise overlook. It is by now a familiar
story within constitutional law circles that some conservative scholars
and, later, officials in the Reagan Justice Department, explicitly promoted
interpretation guided by the intentions of the constitutional drafters.17
Liberal legal scholars responded by quite directly attacking the theoretical
underpinnings of originalism as it was then practiced. 18

ARISTOTLE, RHETORIC, supra note 8, at bk. I, ch. 2.
See id. at bk. I, ch. 1 (arguing that appeals to emotion have no place in legal argument).
14
See John S. Dryzek, Rhetoric in Democracy: A Systemic Appreciation, 38 POL. THEORY 319,
322 (2010) (arguing that those who dismiss rhetoric may miss its usefulness “in stimulating
reasoned reflection and interchange”).
15
See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239, 240 (2009)
(providing a brief explanation of the evolution of originalism).
16
See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611, 620 (1999)
(identifying the shift from original intent to original meaning as the key move of the new
originalism).
17
See JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 153–57 (2005) (describing Attorney General Edwin Meese’s
campaign to promote “a jurisprudence of original intention”); see also Edwin Meese, III, The
Supreme Court of the United States: Bulwark of a Limited Constitution, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 455, 464–
65 (1985) (advocating for judges to interpret the Constitution using the original intent of the
drafters in order to promote democracy).
18
O’NEILL, supra note 17, at 135–37.
12
13
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There were several distinct lines of attack. The notion that we can
divine a single original intent from the underspecified and diverse views
of multiple actors at the constitutional convention was criticized as naïve
and fictitious.19 Some philosophers of language and those steeped in the
hermeneutic tradition argued further that the psychological gymnastics
required to place ourselves in the shoes of people living within a radically
different culture, two centuries distant, simply could not be accomplished
without importing our own views into the project. 20 Legal historians such
as H. Jefferson Powell argued that many of the framers themselves would
have been surprised to learn that their understandings and expectations
were being used as the basis for constitutional interpretation many
generations after their deaths.21 If we accept Professor Powell’s rendering
of the history, then someone who seeks the framers’ guidance could
expect to be told, by the framers, not to seek their guidance. 22
The original meaning approach helped to respond to this academic
criticism.23 Under this approach, constitutional interpretation is governed
not by the subjective intentions of some amorphous group of “Framers”
but rather by the meaning that the words of the Constitution would have
had to a reasonable person who understands the background context. 24
Original meaning originalism does not have the problem of determining
the collective intent of a large and diverse number of people—indeed it
has the opposite problem, if any, since the person whose understanding it
seeks is entirely hypothetical.25 Original meaning originalism also does
not have the problem of being potentially foreclosed by the framers’ own
expectations as to constitutional method. 26 Professor Powell’s article itself
suggests that the framers would have understood the constitutional text
to have an objectified meaning embodied within it, even as they

See Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204,
213–17 (1980) (discussing the complexity of determining how to identify the relevant framers
and their aggregate intentions).
20
See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism and
Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793 (1983).
21
See H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV.
885, 887–88 (1985).
22
Id.
23
See Barnett, supra note 16, at 620–28 (discussing generally the new originalist response
to criticisms made against the old originalism).
24
See Gary Lawson & Guy Seidman, Originalism as a Legal Enterprise, 23 CONST. COMM. 47,
48 (2006) (explaining the reasonable person construct and its relevance to constitutional
interpretation).
25
See id.
26
See Barnett, supra note 16, at 625–29.
19
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disclaimed reliance on the subjective intentions of constitutional
drafters.27
The broader advantage of original meaning originalism over original
intent originalism is that it has a better-theorized claim to political
authority. The idea is that a democratically empowered supermajority
ratified a constitutional text that had a particular meaning to that polity. 28
As a best practice, we should seek to understand what it is that was
ratified, which is determined by a best and educated guess as to the
meaning of the words at the time.29 The political authority of democratic,
and indeed supermajoritarian, actors is leveraged to supply a reason why
their understandings should be the ones that matter. The original intent
practice lacks this leveraging potential because no one ratified the
subjective intentions of the framers.30 Indeed, since the Convention
debates were not publicized, only people who were present in
Constitution Hall could say with any confidence what those intentions
even were.31
It is fair to say that, among constitutional theorists, original meaning
has won as a theory of originalism and original intent has lost. 32 There is
more, however, that can be said in favor of original intent than
constitutional theorists tend to acknowledge. The problems that beset
reliance on original intent depend on it being understood in
demonstrative terms, that is, on it being used to show or explain why some
constitutional proposition is true. Original intent arguments cannot serve
as the legal equivalent to steps in a mathematical proof because we lack a
satisfactory account of the political authority of the framers’ intentions
standing alone. But original intent arguments might also be used
rhetorically, to persuade someone that some constitutional proposition is
true, and this is an altogether different communicative exercise. 33

See Powell, supra note 21, at 903–04, 914–15.
See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING,
ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 50–61 (1999). Whittington is nominally an
intentionalist, but he derives his intentionalism from his combined views that interpreters
should seek the original meaning of the text and that that meaning is supplied by authorial
intentions. Whittington would distinguish intentions of this sort from subjective
expectations as to how the Constitution should or would be interpreted. Id. at 59–61.
29
See Vasan Kesavan & Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Interpretive Force of the Constitution’s
Secret Drafting History, 91 GEO. L.J. 1113, 1118 (2003).
30
See id. at 1139 (contending that the subjective views of the framers do not themselves
count as authoritative, and did not influence the decisions of the ratifiers).
31
See id. at 1115 (describing the secret nature of the proceedings that took place at the
Philadelphia Convention).
32
Thomas B. Colby, The Sacrifice of the New Originalism, 99 GEO. L.J. 713, 718 (2011).
33
Jamal Greene, The Case for Original Intent, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 1697 (2012).
27
28
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An example will be helpful. Consider the dissenting opinion of Justice
Elena Kagan in Town of Greece v. Galloway.34 The case concerned the
constitutionality of a sectarian prayer that opened town board meetings
in a town in upstate New York.35 The Court upheld the practice, but
Justice Kagan argued that the prayer was not neutral as between religions
and that this violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. 36
To support this point, she dropped the following footnote, which is worth
quoting in full:
That principle [of neutrality] meant as much to the
founders as it does today. The demand for neutrality
among religions is not a product of 21st century “political
correctness,” but of the 18th century view—rendered no
less wise by time—that, in George Washington’s words,
“[r]eligious controversies are always productive of more
acrimony and irreconciliable [sic] hatreds than those
which spring from any other cause.” In an age when
almost no one in this country was not a Christian of one
kind or another, Washington consistently declined to use
language or imagery associated only with that religion.
Thomas Jefferson, who followed the same practice
throughout his life, explained that he omitted any
reference to Jesus Christ in Virginia’s Bill for Establishing
Religious Freedom (a precursor to the Establishment
Clause) in order “to comprehend, within the mantle of
[the law’s] protection, the Jew and the Gentile, the
Christian and Mahometan, the Hindoo, and infidel of
every denomination.” And James Madison, who again
used only nonsectarian language in his writings and
addresses, warned that religious proclamations might, “if
not strictly guarded,” express only “the creed of the
majority and a single sect.” 37
What was Kagan doing in referring to the presidential practices of
Washington, Jefferson, and Madison? One possibility is that these were
steps in a logical process of justifying the claim that the Establishment
Clause requires government neutrality towards religion. The views and
practices of these prominent early Americans might demonstrate the

34
35
36
37

134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014) (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1815–16.
Id. at 1841 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1844 n.1 (internal citations omitted).
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meaning of the Establishment Clause. Since Madison wrote the clause, his
intentions might be viewed as at least helping to supply its meaning.
This rendering of Justice Kagan’s dissent runs directly into the
criticisms of original intent discussed above. Neither Washington nor
Jefferson played any formal role in the passage of the Establishment
Clause. Washington was not significantly involved in the drafting of or
deliberation over the Bill of Rights, and under Article V, the President
plays no official part in the passage of constitutional amendments. 38
Jefferson famously urged the adoption of a bill of rights, 39 and as Justice
Kagan’s dissent suggests, he had mature views about church-state
relations.40 But there is no evidence that the Congress that considered the
Bill of Rights was even aware of Jefferson’s views, much less that they
were especially influenced by them.41 As to Madison, his authorship of
the first draft of the Bill of Rights does not by itself endow his views as to
the meaning of the words with political authority. Indeed, the current
language of the Establishment Clause differs from Madison’s initial draft,
which itself tracked the language of amendments proposed in several
state constitutional ratifying conventions. 42 The logic through which the
Establishment Clause “means” what Washington, Jefferson, or Madison
believed or intended it to mean is obscure at best.
A second possibility is that invocation of these three prominent
framers was demonstrative in a different sense. It could be that Justice
Kagan was actually employing original meaning originalism. That is, it
could be that she took the publicly expressed views of Washington,
Jefferson, and Madison to constitute evidence of how competent users of
the English language who were well informed as to the constitutional
context understood the words of the First Amendment. Proponents of
original meaning originalism often claim that this evidentiary function is
precisely the role played by frequent invocations of the subjective views

See U.S. CONST. art. V.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Dec. 20, 1787), in 12 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (Julian P. Boyd et al. eds., 1950).
40
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1844–45; THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE STATE OF
VIRGINIA 157–61 (William Peden ed., 1955).
41
Mark D. Chadsey, Thomas Jefferson and the Establishment Clause, 40 AKRON L. REV. 623,
632 (2007). Jefferson did not leave Paris, where he was serving as Minister to France, until
September 26, 1789, one day after Congress approved the amendments that would become
the Bill of Rights. See WILLIAM HOWARD ADAMS, THE PARIS YEARS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 22–
23 (1997); NEIL H. COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES,
AND ORIGINS 11 (1997).
42
Noah Feldman, The Intellectual Origins of the Establishment Clause, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 346,
400–03 (2002).
38
39
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of eighteenth century framers, including those expressed at the
Philadelphia Convention and in The Federalist.43
The problem with this position is that taking the views of Washington,
Jefferson, and Madison to carry no more than evidentiary weight as to the
meaning a reasonable eighteenth century American would ascribe to the
Establishment Clause places these men on the same plane as an educated
citizen who did not happen to be a U.S. President. An account of the work
performed by Justice Kagan’s references to Washington, Jefferson, and
Madison that does not depend on their particular status as Founding
Fathers misses something central to the force of her argument. She does,
after all, call them “the founders.”44
And so a third possibility for understanding what Justice Kagan was
doing in her Town of Greece dissent is that she was recruiting Washington,
Jefferson, and Madison not to supply the original definition and scope of
the Establishment Clause, but to “vouch” for the proposition that the
Establishment Clause is neutral as between religions. Here, the choice of
Washington, Jefferson, and Madison is not because—or not only
because—they have special insight into constitutional meaning, but rather
(or in addition) because they are recognized as great statesmen and as
American heroes, and it is useful to align oneself with such people’s views.
This invocation of Washington, Jefferson, and Madison would fall outside
the domain of demonstrative exposition and would move into the domain
of rhetoric.
References to the framers are frequently made in this way, and when
made in this way, provide a response to some of the criticisms of original
intent. The problem of discerning collective intent from numerous,
diverse, and underspecified sources disappears when the speaker
privileges those framers whose imprimatur is especially valuable. Indeed,
the easy way to know that the framers are invoked as much for rhetorical
as for strictly interpretive purposes is to consider the situations in which
judges cite Anti-Federalists such as Brutus, Cato, or the Federal Farmer.
These were learned statesmen every bit as much as Madison or Hamilton
and had as much access to the English language and the constitutional
context, but the Anti-Federalist is hardly ever used as positive authority
to support originalist interpretation. 45 Indeed, it is easy to find instances
of the Anti-Federalist being used as negative authority, that is, as evidence

Barnett, supra note 16, at 622; Kesavan & Paulsen, supra note 29, at 1133; see also Greene,
supra note 33, at 1691–92.
44
Town of Greece, 134 S. Ct. at 1844 n.1 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
45
See Greene, supra note 33, at 1692–94.
43
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of what the Constitution does not mean.46 This practice is difficult to
explain except in rhetorical terms.
This, then, suggests a reconciliation of the original meaning and
original intent positions. Much of the time, these inquiries have different
objectives, and so can peaceably coexist. The possibility, raised by Powell,
that the original intentions of the framers seem not to support original
intent as an interpretive method ceases to be a problem for someone using
the framers for rhetorical ends. The use of the framers in this way is quite
independent of the interpretive method used. Justice Kagan, for example,
is not an originalist, but she nonetheless uses the framers to her rhetorical
benefit. Affiliating her argument with theirs helps to establish its bona
fides; it bolsters her credibility as a speaker, thereby approximating the
ethical form of rhetoric.47
B. Anticanonical Cases
A second familiar discourse whose contours we may better
understand by thinking carefully about rhetoric is judicial reference to
certain kinds of precedent. Recall the high-profile litigation over the
constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act, culminating in National
Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius.48 The bases for the
unconstitutionality of the Act claimed by challengers were entirely
structural in nature. The argument was that requiring Americans to
purchase health insurance exceeded the powers granted to Congress
under the Commerce Clause, the Necessary and Proper Clause, and the
Taxing Power, and that threatening to withdraw Medicaid funding from
states that did not expand eligibility under the program exceeded
Congress’ power under the General Welfare Clause.49 Even though
challengers disclaimed any individual rights attack on the Act, the
Supreme Court’s notorious individual rights decision in Lochner v. New
York made several appearances at oral argument. 50

See id. at 1693.
See Jamal Greene, Pathetic Argument in Constitutional Law, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1389, 1398
(2013). Aristotle’s use of ethical argument differs from the usage here. For Aristotle,
persuasion through ethos emerged from the character of the speech itself. See Colin P. Starger,
Constitutional Law and Rhetoric, 18 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (manuscript at 19–20) (forthcoming
2016). Aristotle’s understanding of ethos has never been the only view of the category, even
classically. See Michael J. Hyde, THE ETHOS OF RHETORIC xvi–xvii (Michael J. Hyde ed., 2004)
(discussing Isocrates’ view that ethical persuasion results in part from the cultivated
character of the speaker).
48
132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).
49
Id. at 2585, 2599, 2602.
50
198 U.S. 45 (1905).
46
47
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Specifically, Solicitor General Donald Verrilli said that “to embark on
the kind of analysis that [the healthcare law’s opponents] suggest the
Court ought to embark on is to import Lochner-style substantive due
process.”51 Chief Justice Roberts, thinking through the implications of the
government’s argument, said “it would be going back to Lochner if we
were put in the position of saying, no, you can use your commerce power
to regulate insurance, but you can’t use your commerce power to regulate
this market in other ways.”52 Finally, Justice Sotomayor asked Paul
Clement, representing the challengers to the mandate, whether he was
advancing “a Lochner era argument that only the States can [require the
purchase of insurance] even though it affects commerce.”53
The Lochner Court invalidated a New York law that regulated the
working hours of bakers.54 It was an individual rights case, not a
structural case. It was about state rather than federal power. It was about
controlling working hours, not forcing individuals to purchase health
insurance or anything else. It had been decided more than a century
earlier and had been effectively overruled in 1937.55 And yet the Solicitor
General, the Chief Justice, and Justice Sotomayor each invoked Lochner,
and each invoked it for a different substantive point. For Verrilli, Lochner
stood for economic due process, for Chief Justice Roberts it stood for
inappropriate judicial line-drawing with respect to Congress’ powers, and
for Justice Sotomayor it stood for inherent limitations on federal power.
Consider a second recent example. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the
Supreme Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment requires states
to extend marriage rights to same-sex couples.56 Dissenting, Chief Justice
Roberts not only cited Lochner repeatedly, but also cited Dred Scott v.
Sandford as an example of substantive due process gone awry.57 Chief
Justice Taney’s lead opinion in Dred Scott had declared that a law
prohibiting slavery in federal territories would violate the due process
rights of traveling slaveholders.58 Chief Justice Roberts’ Obergefell dissent
poignantly reminds us that “Dred Scott’s holding was overruled on the
Transcript of Oral Argument at 30, Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566
(2012) (No. 11-398).
52
Id. at 40.
53
Id. at 67–68.
54
See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 52.
55
See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937) (invalidating a minimum
wage law for women); see also United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941) (rejecting a
substantive due process challenge to the maximum hours provisions of the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938).
56
135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
57
See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393 (1857); see also Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2616–17
(Roberts, J. dissenting).
58
See Dred Scott, 60 U.S. at 450.
51
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battlefields of the Civil War and by constitutional amendment after
Appomattox.”59
Citing a case for reasons unrelated to its underlying facts makes little
sense if we understand invocation of precedent in purely demonstrative
terms. In the common law model, precedent is cited in order to be
affirmed as implicating similar application of law to fact, or in order to be
distinguished as relying on different facts.60 Why cite and discuss Lochner
in a case in which there is no state law issue, no individual rights issue,
and no maximum hours or labor issue? It is difficult, moreover, to
construct an orthodox theory of precedent under which Chief Justice
Roberts’ reference to the Dred Scott decision was relevant in a marriage
equality case. He could not mean to say that granting marriage rights to
same sex couples—which he said had “undeniable appeal”61—was akin
to endorsing chattel slavery. It could be that he meant to say that judicial
overreach was the common sin in both cases, and led to war in Dred Scott.
However the relationship between Dred Scott and the start of the Civil War
is hardly obvious, and in any event Chief Justice Roberts does not believe
same-sex marriage will lead to existential armed conflict or anything like
it.62 Furthermore, since Dred Scott is conceded not to be good law, there is
no institutional need to cite it, grudgingly or otherwise. So why did he
cite it?
In the National Federation of Independent Business oral argument and in
Chief Justice Roberts’ Obergefell dissent, Lochner and Dred Scott
respectively were being used rhetorically rather than demonstratively.
Lochner is a third rail of American constitutional law for reasons having
little to do with maximum hour laws or even individual rights. The
Lochner era was subject to a high-profile political repudiation that is
perceived to have helped end the Great Depression and led to the creation
of the modern administrative state. Dred Scott’s negative valence (these
days)63 is less for its invocation of substantive due process or even its
support for slavery, but rather for its cold repudiation of the possibility of

Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, J. dissenting).
See FREDERICK SCHAUER, THINKING LIKE A LAWYER: A NEW INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL
REASONING 103–05 (2009).
61
Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2611.
62
See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS 561–67 (1978).
63
The conventional story as to what was wrong with Dred Scott has undergone revision
over time. For many years its error was viewed as prudential rather than moral: in light of
the holding that Scott was ineligible for citizenship and therefore could not claim diversity
jurisdiction in federal court, the Court had neither the need nor even the power to adjudicate
his substantive claim to freedom. United States v. UAW-CIO, 352 U.S. 567, 590 (1957);
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 62, at 335–36.
59
60
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black citizenship.64 Citation of other cases—Brown v. Board of Education65
on the positive side and Plessy v. Ferguson66 and Korematsu v. United States67
on the negative side—serve a similar rhetorical function. Their negative
valence is supplied by events outside of law as such, and it acts as a kind
of epithet that stirs the blood, like any good pathos-driven (or “pathetic”)
argument.68 Mining citations to these cases for some narrowly doctrinal
connection to the cases in which they are cited is often futile.
C. The Oxymoron of Substantive Due Process
A third example, more tentative than the first two, where recognizing
the role of rhetoric might illuminate constitutional practice relates
indirectly to Lochner and relates directly to one of the many charges laid
against it: its invocation of substantive due process. It is frequently said
that substantive due process makes nonsense of the constitutional text,
that it is oxymoronic. John Hart Ely memorably wrote that substantive
due process is “a contradiction in terms, sort of like ‘green pastel
redness.’”69 Commentators have called the notion of “substantive”
process an “atextual invention”70 that is “incorrigibly selfcontradictory.”71 Indeed, Ely’s phrase about green pastel redness has
itself has been cited in well over 100 law review articles. 72 Modern
substantive due process is a favorite target for conservatives in particular.
To take one illustrative example, Robert Bork wrote in 1990 that “[i]t is

Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857) (“[Blacks] had for more than a century
before been regarded as beings of an inferior order, and altogether unfit to associate with the
white race, either in social or political relations; and so far inferior, that they had no rights
which the white man was bound to respect; and that the negro might justly and lawfully be
reduced to slavery for his benefit.”).
65
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
66
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
67
323 U.S. 214 (1944).
68
See Greene, supra note 33, at 1440.
69
JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980).
70
Michael Stokes Paulsen, Does the Constitution Prescribe Rules for Its Own Interpretation?,
103 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 897 (2009).
71
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., A NEW BIRTH OF FREEDOM: HUMAN RIGHTS, NAMED AND
UNNAMED 91 (1997).
72
See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, Be Careful What You Wish For: Why McDonald v. City of
Chicago’s Rejection of the Privileges or Immunities Clause May Not Be Such a Bad Thing of Rights,
115 PENN. ST. L. REV. 561, 579 (2011); Adam Lamparello & Charles E. MacLean, It’s the People’s
Constitution, Stupid: Two Liberals Pay Tribute to Antonin Scalia’s Legacy, 45 U. MEM. L. REV.
281, 311 (2015); Laurence H. Tribe, The Ones I Feel Sorry For, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1760, 1761
(2004).
64
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clear that the text of the due process clause will not support judicial efforts
to pour substantive rather than procedural meaning into it.”73
The problem with these broadsides against substantive due process is
that they are not true. While there may be a strong case against
substantive due process on historical or prudential grounds, the textual
case against it is remarkably weak.74 As is clear from due process cases
dating at least to Goldberg v. Kelly, the word “due” requires an adjudicator
to assess the severity of the deprivation in order to specify the appropriate
procedure.75 The constitutional text does not limit the word “process” to
judicial procedures, and so to say that some deprivations are sufficiently
severe that neither ordinary majoritarian legislation nor rational basis
judicial review is sufficient to affect them is consistent with the text. This
is substantive due process in a nutshell: a law that restricts fundamental
rights either requires the supermajority necessary for a constitutional
amendment or it requires the legislature to pursue some important
interest, for there to be a reasonable means-ends fit, and for the fitness of
the legislation by these measures to be evaluated judicially.
Again, there might be any number of objections to this exercise of
judicial review, but there is nothing in the text of the Constitution alone
that makes substantive due process absurd or self-contradictory. Of
course, constitutional text does not stand alone, unadorned by historical
practice or doctrinal evolution. Giving “process” the liberal reading
suggested above may seem to misread a term of art within legal discourse,
one that tends to be associated with a specific set of adjudicatory or quasiadjudicatory procedures and prerequisites: notice of adverse claims, an
opportunity to be heard before a neutral tribunal, the availability of
counsel, and so forth. But in fact the textual criticism of substantive due
process is itself a strategy to arrest doctrinal evolution towards an
expansive, contextual reading of the broader due process clause. 76 The
Supreme Court has never rejected substantive due process and there is
ample historical evidence to suggest that the generation that ratified the
ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 32
(1990); see also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2640 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(referring to substantive due process as a “distort[ion of] the constitutional text); ANTONIN
SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 24–25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) (arguing that to adopt substantive
due process is “to abandon textualism”).
74
See Jamal Greene, The Meming of Substantive Due Process, 30 CONST. COMM. -(forthcoming 2016) (manuscript on file with the author).
75
See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 264 (1970) (holding that due process requires an
administrative hearing prior to the withdrawal of welfare benefits).
76
Cf. L.L. Fuller, Legal Fictions, 25 ILL. L. REV. 363, 377 (1930) (arguing that the claim that
a legal term is a fiction “must be based ultimately on the notion that the word . . . has reached
the legitimate end of its evolution and that it ought to be pinned down where it now is”).
73
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Fourteenth Amendment understood the Due Process Clause as having
substantive reach.77 That is, the clause is indeed a legal term of art, and its
meaning is contested. Claims about the inherent meaning of the text are,
unremarkably, internal to trench warfare over the scope of the Fourteenth
Amendment. There is nothing obvious about substantive due process,
including its relationship to the text.
That said, Ely’s phrase—“substantive due process is like green pastel
redness”—is so felicitous because substance and process do form a standard
dichotomy in legal discourse.78 Substantive due process suffers from a
kind of marketing or optics problem: proponents should simply leave the
word “substantive” out or else perhaps start calling it legislative due
process. That might put the stress on “due,” which emphasizes its
substantive character, rather than on “substantive,” which feels like it is
in tension with “process.”79
What does this have to do with rhetoric? The idea that substantive
due process is an oxymoron or is a contradiction in terms has significant
rhetorical purchase, and the idea persists in part for that reason. Even if
the best case against substantive due process is historical or prudential
rather than textual, the chuckles or knowing nods one can elicit by
criticizing it as oxymoronic are worth more to a judge or commentator
than even the most ingenious historical argument about the original
understanding of the due process clause.
This example is in some ways more interesting than our first two. As
described above, original intent arguments and invocations of
anticanonical cases rely, respectively, on ethical and pathetic rhetorical
modes. By contrast, the fallacy of substantive due process as an oxymoron
relies most substantially on a logical mode of persuasion. The underlying
proposition—that substantive due process is textually invalid—is
supported by syllogistic, though ultimately sophistic, reasoning. This
observation should underscore that logical presentation of arguments
may be entirely consistent with rhetoric and indeed there is good reason
to believe that this is the dominant rhetorical form in U.S. constitutional
opinions.

See Ryan C. Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408,
416 (2010).
78
ELY, supra note 69, at 18.
79
See Timothy Sandefur, In Defense of Substantive Due Process, or the Promise of Lawful Rule,
35 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 283, 330 (2012) (“A procedure-only approach to due process
cannot account for the meaning of the word ‘due.’”).
77
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D. Citation of Foreign Law
A final example that can clarify how understanding the role of rhetoric
might help us to better understand judicial practices comes from the
debate over citation of transnational law in constitutional opinions. One
of the main criticisms of the use of such sources is that it requires selective
citation—“cherry-picking”—and thus lacks integrity.80 American judges
and commentators engaged in foreign law citation tend either to self-limit
or be limited by circumstance to English-language jurisdictions, Western
or Westminster-influenced democracies, and jurisdictions whose opinions
are sufficiently studied that they may meaningfully be cited and
understood by the citing judge.81 This is a real problem from a certain
perspective and indeed from the perspective that Justice Breyer—the
Supreme Court’s most vocal defender of foreign law citation—has
suggested motivates his citation practices. 82 That perspective is what
Mark Tushnet calls “functionalist.”83 In constitutional interpretation we
do not just care about text, structure, history, and precedent, but we also
care about consequences. On this view, other jurisdictions whose
constitutional judges have handled similar cases provide data points to
help uncover a range of approaches that meet shared (or at least
coinciding) objectives or purposes.84 We can look to those other
jurisdictions to give us data on the consequences of adopting a particular
approach within our own jurisdictions.85
The problem is that assessing the consequences of a particular
constitutional arrangement requires an empirical inquiry, and in
conducting an empirical inquiry, one must be attentive to principles of
case selection.86 The criteria for selection should be grounded in an
See Norman Dorsen, The Relevance of Foreign Legal Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases:
A Conversation Between Justice Antonin Scalia and Justice Stephen Breyer, 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519,
521–22 (2005) (transcribing Justice Scalia’s complaint about selective citation of foreign
examples); Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1581 (2004) (emphasizing that in Lawrence v. Texas, the Court picked
decisions around the world that it favored).
81
See RAN HIRSCHL, COMPARATIVE MATTERS: THE RENAISSANCE OF COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 205–06 (2014) (describing the tendency of comparative public law
scholars to hold out as representative “the constitutional experience of half a dozen (on a
good day) politically stable, economically prosperous, liberal democracies”).
82
See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
experiences of other jurisdictions “cast an empirical light on the consequences of different
solutions to a common legal problem”).
83
See Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225,
1238 (1999).
84
See id.
85
See Printz, 521 U.S. at 976–77 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
86
See HIRSCHL, supra note 81, at 22–81.
80
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empirical strategy that controls for relevant differences between selected
jurisdictions, or else uses those differences as leverage in attaching weight
to an independent variable of interest. 87 Case selection emphatically
should not be based on whether a jurisdiction writes in or translates its
opinions into English88 or has judges who happen to be especially effective
in circulating their work to a global audience. 89 Once we recognize that
empirical questions require attention to case selection principles, the
implications for a functionalist approach are disquieting. Judges can try
their best to identify appropriate bases for comparison, but they have
limited time and resources. The problem of selection bias haunts the
whole enterprise of constitutional comparison when the objective of that
comparison is understood in functional terms.
The observations of this Essay offer a way out. Are the reasons for
citation of foreign law in U.S. constitutional cases always demonstrative?
Are they always, or even typically, aimed at supplying a descriptive
account of constitutional practice elsewhere, as a way of filling in the
meaning and requirements of a domestic constitutional norm? Consider
Roper v. Simmons, a prominent example of foreign law citation in a U.S.
constitutional case at the Supreme Court. 90 Roper concerned the
constitutionality of executing convicted murderers who were juveniles at
the time of the offense.91 After stating his conclusion that the practice
contravenes the Eighth Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual
punishments, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, added a
discussion of the prevalence of juvenile execution around the world. 92 He
included the following sentence: “Respondent and his amici have
submitted, and petitioner does not contest, that only seven countries other
than the United States have executed juvenile offenders since 1990: Iran,
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of

See id. at 245–55 (describing what Hirschl calls the “most similar cases” and the “most
different cases” principles).
88
See ROSALIND DIXON & TOM GINSBURG, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 13 (Tom Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon eds., 2011) (“It is probably the
case that 90% of comparative work in the English language covers the same ten countries,
for which materials are easily accessible in English.”).
89
See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 65–66 (2004) (discussing
interactions among judges at global seminars); Hon. Claire L’Heureux-Dube, The Importance
of Dialogue: Globalization and the International Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15,
26 (1998) (discussing personal contacts with other judges as a significant driver of global
judicial dialogue). Cf. David S. Law & Wen-Chen Chang, The Limits of Global Judicial
Dialogue, 86 WASH. L. REV. 523, 527 (2011) (arguing that citation patterns do not reflect
judicial dialogue).
90
543 U.S. 551 (2005).
91
See id. at 555–56.
92
See id. at 575–78.
87
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Congo, and China.”93 These are all countries that are known to be deeply
illiberal or that have committed or tolerated systematic human right
abuses in the recent past. It is possible to cite these examples functionally,
as a step in an argument that says that continuing to execute juvenile
offenders leads to illiberal outcomes. But to complete the argument would
require an empirical investigation of, for example, whether those
countries that have abolished juvenile execution have done so through
legislative or judicial pathways, what the effects on crime control have
been, whether states are unitary or federal systems, and so forth.
Alternatively, we can understand the importance of this style of
citation in rhetorical rather than demonstrative terms. What Justice
Kennedy is really saying is that executing juveniles is uncivilized; citing
the countries that do it communicates the message viscerally rather than
demonstratively. The criticism that Justice Scalia and others have made,
that like legislative history, foreign law citation involves looking out over
a crowd and just picking out your friends, seems exactly appropriate if we
understand the practice in rhetorical terms.94 We like and trust our friends
more than our enemies or mere acquaintances, and so we use our friends’
practices to vouch for our own or use association with the practices of our
enemies to shame our opponents. The reason to cherry-pick Iran and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo in arguments against juvenile
execution aligns with the reason to cherry-pick Anti-Federalists in
arguments against disfavored constitutional positions.
II. JUDICIAL RHETORIC IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
These four examples all show ways in which employing a different
conceptual vocabulary can help us transcend debates within
constitutional theory that had seemed to be spinning their wheels. But the
way the examples do so is controversial. Rhetoric has a bad reputation,
and to say fallacious constitutional arguments are made in its service
seems to reinforce the fallacy.95 This Part shows that rhetoric, even when
misleading in a narrow sense, can serve as a partner to the legitimating
discourse of constitutional law.
Constitutional law has a set of familiar and overlapping taxonomies
of argument forms.96 These forms are an important element of
Id. at 577.
See Dorsen, supra note 80, at 530.
95
See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 471–75 (1989).
96
See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 3–92
(1982) (specifying constitutional argument forms); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist
Coherence Theory of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1195–1209 (1987).
93
94
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constitutional practice because constitutional law needs ways of
distinguishing itself from politics. By fostering implicit limits on the kinds
of arguments that “count,” constitutional law discourse cultivates a
distinctive normative community.
The kinds of arguments that
characterize that discourse are typically said to include textual, structural,
historical, precedent-based, and prudential arguments.97 Most arguments
that count within the community of U.S. constitutional lawyers are either
about the meaning of the constitutional text; implications generated from
constitutional structure or the relationships immanent within the
constitutional architecture; historical intentions or the contemporaneous
meaning of the Constitution’s words; judicial precedent or historical
political practice; or the consequences for the institutional legitimacy of
the judiciary or for the effective functioning of governmental, and
especially federal governmental, institutions. 98 To this list we could add
values-based arguments that appeal to some higher-order moral norm or
ethical arguments drawing on the distinctive character of the American
people, but whether these argument types are included is subject to some
debate.99
Scholars of classical rhetoric have their own set of taxonomies. 100 The
most basic one is the tripartite distinction between logos, ethos, and pathos
discussed at the beginning of Part I. Accepting the claim that rhetorical
statements have a home within constitutional discourse requires one to
integrate this or some related schematic into the well-established
categories of constitutional argument. One possibility is that these
rhetorical forms simply supplement the traditional categories. Thus,
constitutional discourse is constituted in part by, say, appeals to emotion
in addition to being constituted by, say, appeals to the constitutional text.
Were this the best description of the role rhetoric plays in constitutional
argument, it would defeat constitutional law’s claim to distinctiveness.
The better view is that the forms of rhetoric modify rather than
supplement, displace, or challenge the traditional categories.101 We can
think of other modes—text, structure, history, precedent, and
consequences—as being domains or subjects of constitutional
argument.102 What makes constitutional argument a distinct form of
political debate and political settlement is that it channels political dispute
into these particular domains. But what makes constitutional law
See BOBBITT, supra note 96, at 7; Fallon, Jr., supra note 96, at 1194.
See Fallon, Jr., supra note 96, at 1252–68.
99
See Patrick O. Gudridge, False Peace and Constitutional Tradition, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1952,
1969, 1975 (1983) (reviewing BOBBITT, supra note 96).
100
Greene, supra note 33, at 1463–65.
101
See id. at 1424.
102
See id. at 1394–95.
97
98
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continuous with other forms of practical reasoning is that the
communicative elements of constitutional law—its opinions—employ
logical, ethical, and pathetic rhetorical strategies in order to persuade their
audience that the propositions they assert, with respect to text, history,
structure, and so forth, are correct.103
Constitutional lawyers need to get this right. It is easy to casually
dismiss rhetoric in judicial opinion writing as either pernicious and
lawless or trivial and unimportant. But within the American system, the
ability of a judge to persuade her audience that she is right forms part of
the normative criteria for her performance. Put otherwise, the fact that a
judge is unable to persuade her audience that she is correct is, without
more, a reason to think she might not be correct. 104 Judges in the United
States must constantly attend to the conditions of their own
legitimacy105—Hamilton recognized that as early as Federalist 78 when he
famously called the judicial branch the least dangerous branch, having
“no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either of the
strength or of the wealth of the society; . . . hav[ing] neither force nor will,
but merely judgment.”106 What judges have is a jealously guarded
reservoir of good will that lends moral force to their pronouncements. 107
One of the conditions for judicial legitimacy, therefore, is popular
acceptance of what the courts are doing.108 This acceptance might be more
important when a judge purports to invalidate the work of the popular
branches than when she validates it, but it is important either way. The
case for its normative importance is strengthened to the degree scholars
adopt forms of popular constitutionalism that place citizens at the table in
constitutional interpretation and that privilege dialogue between judges
and social and political actors.
If persuasion carries independent normative weight in American
constitutional law, then at least three somewhat unsettling implications
might follow. First, what a judge says in an opinion owes something to
rhetoric. That is, it is not enough for a judge writing an opinion to explain
his or her thinking in a demonstrative sense. He or she must also do so

See id.
See Richard Primus, Double-Consciousness in Constitutional Adjudication, 13 REV. CONST.
STUD. 1, 2 (2007).
105
See Neil S. Siegel, The Virtue of Judicial Statesmanship, 86 TEX. L. REV. 959, 963 (2008).
106
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, 392 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009) (discussing
the need for judges to attend to the conditions of law’s public legitimation).
107
In political science this reservoir is sometimes called diffuse support. See infra notes
122–23 and accompanying text.
108
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 1792
(2005) (maintaining that the Constitution’s legal legitimacy depends on its present
sociological acceptance).
103
104
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with at least some degree of style, perhaps even at the occasional expense
of clarifying the argument in a demonstrative sense or to the satisfaction
of a Platonic philosopher. It is possible to overstate this tension. We
expect a certain degree of legalism from our judges, and so departing from
that norm in an overt way will in many cases undermine an opinion’s
persuasive effect. Put another way, logos is a powerful rhetorical mode for
judges and so recognizing the rhetorical requisites of judicial opinion
writing is not a call to abandon logic without due reflection.
Still, sometimes the best way to get one’s point across is to show rather
than tell. Thus, pathos—appeal to emotion—is a useful rhetorical mode
even for judges. In a conventional sense, an appeal to emotion might have
greater claim to legitimacy in a judicial opinion when it is in the service of
persuading the reader as to a proposition within the traditional
interpretive domains of constitutional law. An emotional appeal as a way
of advancing a textual or historical claim seems to me entirely within the
pale, whereas a similar appeal as a way of doing little more than
persuading someone that a litigant should win or lose, unmediated
through traditional constitutional subjects of argument, is more
problematic.
An example will be helpful. In the 2014 Term, Justice Thomas chose
to use the Court’s capital docket as a platform for judicially crafted victim
impact statements.109 Thus, in Glossip v. Gross, he responded to Justice
Breyer’s dissenting opinion calling for a reconsideration of the
constitutionality of capital punishment with a catalog of the acts for which
petitioners who had sought stays of execution during the Term had been
convicted.110 The ostensible purpose was to demonstrate that capital
defendants are nearly uniformly deserving of the most severe
punishment, thereby undermining Justice Breyer’s claim that death
sentences were handed down arbitrarily.111
In Brumfield v. Cain, a case involving application of the Court’s
exemption of mentally disabled persons from execution, Justice Thomas
wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion that, among other things, detailed the
remarkable life and public works of the victim’s son, a professional
football star.112 Justice Thomas appended a photograph of the victim to

Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2750–55 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring); Brumfield v.
Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2285 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2210
(2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
110
See Glossip, 135 S. Ct. at 2753 (Thomas, J., concurring).
111
See id. at 2752 (“In my decades on the Court, I have not seen a capital crime that could
not be considered sufficiently ‘blameworthy’ to merit a death sentence (even when genuine
constitutional errors justified a vacatur of that sentence).”).
112
See Brumfield, 135 S. Ct. at 2286–87 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
109
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the end of his opinion.113 Justice Thomas’ discussion of the victim’s son
was sufficiently unusual that some of his fellow dissenting colleagues
refused to join it. Justice Alito wrote (joined by Chief Justice Roberts):
“The story recounted in that Part is inspiring and will serve a very
beneficial purpose if widely read, but I do not want to suggest that it is
essential to the legal analysis in this case.”114 Finally, in Davis v. Ayala,
which considered the degree of deference owed a state court harmless
error determination in federal habeas review, Justice Kennedy wrote
separately to express concern over the proliferation of solitary
confinement in U.S. prisons.115 Justice Thomas wrote the following curt
response to Justice Kennedy’s opinion:
I write separately only to point out, in response to the
separate opinion of Justice Kennedy that the
accommodations in which Ayala is housed are a far sight
more spacious than those in which his victims, Ernesto
Dominguez Mendez, Marcos Antonio Zamora, and Jose
Luis Rositas, now rest. And, given that his victims were
all 31 years of age or under, Ayala will soon have had as
much or more time to enjoy those accommodations as his
victims had time to enjoy this Earth.116
Needless to say, the opinion in Ayala traveled some distance from
technical construction of the federal habeas statute.
Each of the three Justice Thomas opinions referenced above seeks to
persuade in the pathetic mode—they appeal directly to the emotions of
the reader. But they also differ from one another in a respect that lends
some criteria to our evaluation of constitutional rhetoric. The Glossip
opinion appeals to emotion in the service of a claim about the
consequences of capital punishment. Justice Breyer’s opinion argues that,
within our federal system, capital punishment must be either unreliable
or arbitrary.117 Justice Thomas’ rebuttal consists in arguing that, because
all capital defendants are deserving of death, capital punishment is not
arbitrary in a way that should raise moral concern. 118
By contrast, Justice Thomas’ emotional appeals in his Brumfield and
Ayala opinions do not modify any recognizable constitutional claim. They
appear to serve no purpose other than to arouse enmity and,
113
114
115
116
117
118
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See Davis v. Ayala, 135 S. Ct. 2187, 2208–10 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 2210 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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consequently, disgust: in Brumfield, disgust that someone who committed
a horrific act may be spared death, and in Ayala, disgust at the prospect
that the state might be made to attend to a convicted murderer’s
conditions of confinement. An emotional appeal directed solely at the
ultimate disposition in the case feels off-key in a way in which a similar
appeal that amplifies a recognized legal argument does not. This is not to
say that Justice Thomas’ Glossip opinion was not over-the-top or hamhanded, but it is to say that it fits our constitutional tradition in a way that
the other two opinions categorically do not. It is no wonder that
commentators have compared those opinions to Justice Blackmun’s
memorable and oft-criticized “Poor Joshua” dissent, which openly
sympathized with a child abuse victim whom the majority declared not to
have a constitutional remedy.119
Even if one measure of the legitimacy of constitutional rhetoric is its
relationship to traditional forms of constitutional argument, we must ask
whether it is the only measure. Beyond that relationship, do we measure
rhetoric solely by its power to persuade? Would it be appropriate, for
example, for a judge to make even a logical case for a proposition of
constitutional law if she thinks the logical case will persuade others but it
does not persuade the judge herself or adequately explain her analytic
process? This question raises the second unsettling implication of
understanding rhetoric as having independent normative significance:
there may be times when rhetorical demands make it appropriate for a
judicial opinion to take a certain form, or even reach a certain outcome,
that is at odds with the judge’s own thinking. Put otherwise, the
significance of persuasion as a part of the judicial function might well
compete with the significance of candor or transparency. In some sense,
many of us intuit this to be true. Consider, for example, the role of
religious conviction in judicial decision making. We might or might not
think it is appropriate for religion to influence how a judge approaches a
constitutional issue. A committed legal realist or attitudinalist might
assume the judge in fact has no control over this. But most of us agree that
the judge’s personal religious convictions should play no role in the
opinion the judge writes, and we would find the opinion less persuasive
as constitutional law if it included religious elements in its written

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 213 (1989) (Blackmun,
J., dissenting); compare Mark Joseph Stern, Has Clarence Thomas Forgotten What His Job Is?,
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jurisprudence/2015/06/clarence_thomas_opinion_in_brumfield_v_cain_has_he_forgotten
_he_s_a_supreme.html [http://perma.cc/2FUG-B9KV], with Jeffrey Rosen, Sentimental
Journey: The Emotional Jurisprudence of Harry Blackmun, NEW REPUBLIC 13 (May 2, 1994).
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presentation. Justice would not, in that case, “be seen to be done.”120 And
as noted, constitutional law must satisfy this condition.
At this point one must pause to consider the nature of the judicial
audience. I say “we” would find an appeal to religion in constitutional
argument less convincing, but what I mean by “we” is the professional
legal elite. Thus, a third possible and, if true, unsettling implication of the
argument: If we believe that persuasion carries independent normative
weight in constitutional opinion-writing, we must consider the possibility
that those who ultimately need to be persuaded are not just legally
unsophisticated but have illiberal ends. Parochialism and chauvinism
might be necessary features of a conventionally accepted constitutional
order. In fact, the choices are unlikely to be so stark. I suspect that if the
American people were in fact illiberal in a higher law sense—that is, were
not committed in some deep sense to a culture of rights—then we would
find judicial review intolerable.121 And so when we speak of rhetoric and
of the demands that the need to persuade places on the judicial role, we
must understand the object of persuasion to bear not necessarily upon the
individual outcome in any particular case, but rather upon the consistency
of the opinion with conventional understandings of the judicial role.
Political scientists distinguish the “specific support” for decisions of the
courts from “diffuse support” for courts in an institutional sense. 122
Diffuse support is less sensitive to particular decisions; there is an
inelasticity to it that suggests a reasonable margin of appreciation for
courts to reach decisions that members of the polity may disagree with or
find unpersuasive in their particulars.123
III. CONCLUSION
It is appropriate to close, then, with an observation about the degree
to which this Essay’s claims are contingent upon a particular judicial
culture and a particular kind of Constitution. The case for persuasion
carrying independent normative weight depends on understanding
constitutional lawmaking by judges as being in dialogue with the polity.
Many civil law jurisdictions distinguish sharply between ordinary
legislative power and what is sometimes called constituent power or
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pouvoir constituant.124 Constitutional revision requires activation of that
constituting power and the role of a constitutional judge is to keep faith
with constitutional law as codified by those authorized to exercise that
constituting power. Jurisdictions in which this view is prominent tend to
have more accessible modes of constitutional amendment than Article V
of the U.S. Constitution.125 A constitution that is viewed in different terms
than the American one, and in particular a constitution that is viewed
either in large measure as a technical document or one that, even if not
purely technical, is not associated pervasively with national political
identity seems likely to place relatively weak demands of persuasion on
courts. A constitutional order of that sort seems less likely to give rise to
a judicial culture that gives rhetoric a long leash. One’s Frenchness does
not depend on acceptance of or affiliation with the 1958 Constitution, in
the way that one’s Americanness might depend on one’s affiliation with
particular political commitments embodied in the U.S. Constitution. 126
Under the circumstances, the dry syllogistic reasoning one observes in
French courts, even in constitutional cases, may be good enough. Notice,
though, that this might be characterized simply as different weight that
other jurisdictions might attach to logos as against pathos or ethos in
assessing what counts as persuasive for judges. Maintaining consistency
with the conventional judicial role might well make normative demands
on opinion writing quite apart from one’s theory of the relationship
between “the people” and constitutional elaboration. In that case, the
application of these observations to U.S. constitutional law simply makes
a stronger case for attention to rhetoric than would exist under a different
kind of constitution.
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